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Abstract
Background: In order to determine how best to tailor outreach messages about poxvirus diagnosis and infection
control for health practitioners, we surveyed infectious disease physicians in the Infectious Diseases Society of
America’s Emerging Infections Network.
Findings: Surveys consisting of two unknown case scenarios designed to raise suspicion for monkeypox and orf
were distributed to the 1,080 members of the EIN. The surveys contained questions pertaining to which diagnostic
tests, points of contact, and transmission precautions they would likely utilize during patient evaluation. Basic
response rates and frequencies of responses were calculated. Comparisons of the survey responses were made
using the chi-square test. Of the 212 members who responded (20% response rate), significantly more respondents
indicated that they would request diagnostic testing in the context of the monkeypox case scenario as compared
to the orf case scenario. A significantly higher number of respondents indicated they would institute droplet or
airborne precautions for the monkeypox case as opposed to the orf case scenario.
Conclusions: This survey provided an opportunity for public health practitioners to gain insight into physician
approaches to evaluation, diagnosis and reporting of suspected poxvirus-associated infections. This survey
identified key areas in which public health practitioners can better serve physicians by focusing on education. As a
result we were able to identify potential knowledge gaps and deficits in the availability of useful resources to
facilitate accurate case identification and management.
Findings
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renewed concerns regarding bioterrorism, poxvirus
infections have garnered increased attention from medi-
cal and public health professionals alike.
There are multiple poxviruses of significance to
human health that occur in the United States. These
include Molluscum contagiosum virus, which causes
common viral infections of the skin, and various para-
poxviruses, such as Orf virus and Pseudocowpox virus,
which are zoonotic entities associated with domestic
ruminants (e.g., sheep, goats, cattle). Human parapox-
virus infections occur primarily in rural communities,
but may also occur in larger communities with live ani-
mal markets, petting zoos and small-scale animal hus-
bandry [1]. Inadvertent Vaccinia virus infections also
occur in the United States. Vaccinia is the primary com-
ponent of the smallpox vaccine and infections can occur
following contact with a recent vaccinee or via exposure
t ot h ev i r u si nal a b o r a t o r y[ 2-4]. Additionally, the cur-
rent oral rabies vaccine (ORV), used to prevent the
spread of terrestrial rabies along the Eastern seaboard,
consists of a recombinant vaccinia virus containing the
rabies virus glycoprotein gene. Two human infections
following contact with ORV has been reported [5-7].
Importation of poxviruses from abroad is also a con-
cern. This occurred in 2003 when monkeypox infected
African rodents were imported to the United States
resulting in a outbreak of monkeypox [8,9]. Monkeypox
virus is a communicable orthopoxvirus which can cause
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(smallpox). This event marked the first time that human
monkeypox infections had been observed in the Wes-
tern Hemisphere. There have also been two reports of
Tanapox virus (a yatapoxvirus) infections in travelers
returning to the U.S. from Africa [10,11]
Many poxvirus infections share common clinical fea-
tures (e.g., vesiculo-pustular or nodular rash lesion char-
acteristics) but have differing risks for person-to-person
transmission, thus necessitating different infection con-
trol measures. Poxvirus infections can be confused with
other infections or conditions. This underscores the
importance of laboratory diagnostic evaluation when
poxvirus infections are suspected. Diagnostic testing for
poxvirus infections is available; however most are only
available at specialized reference centers (e.g., Labora-
tory Response Network facilities, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC)).
We surveyed infectious disease physicians in the Infec-
t i o u sD i s e a s e sS o c i e t yo fA m e r i c a ’s( I D S A )E m e r g i n g
Infections Network (EIN) to gather insight on current
diagnostic and infection control practices for suspect
poxviruses in order to tailor outreach messages to health
practitioners. In addition, we sought to determine what
resources were readily available to physicians to assist in
evaluation of suspected poxvirus infections. This survey
also allowed us to gain some insight into the frequency
and spectrum of poxvirus infections seen by this net-
work of consultants.
IDSA’s EIN is a provider-based emerging infections
sentinel network of adult and pediatric infectious disease
consultants. This network was established through a
Cooperative Agreement Program Award in 1995 from
the CDC [12].
During February and March of 2007, surveys were dis-
tributed by e-mail and facsimile to the 1,080 EIN. Parti-
cipants were encouraged to use any reference material
they deemed necessary to complete the query and were
a l l o w e dt ol o gi na n do u to ft h es u r v e yi ft h e yr e q u i r e d
more time.
Our survey was developed to assess clinical experi-
ence, infection control practices, and diagnostic algo-
rithms related to poxviruses .T h es u r v e yc o n s i s t e do f
two unknown case scenarios designed to raise suspicion
for monkeypox and orf (Figure 1A and 1B, respectively)
with corresponding questions pertaining to which diag-
nostic tests and transmission precautions they would
likely use during patient evaluation [Additional file 1:
Copy of survey]. Members were queried as to their likely
immediate points of contact for reporting of the suspi-
cious illnesses. In order to gain some insight on the
poxvirus experience for physicians in various regions of
the country, members were also asked to document the
types of poxviruses they have ever seen in their practice.
Since the first distribution of the survey resulted in a
low response rate, respondents were given the option of
omitting their name from the second round of distribu-
tion. They were also given a choice of submitting their
state and practice type in lieu of their name. Therefore,
since demographic data is linked by name, some respon-
dents do not have linked demographic data.
Basic response rates for demographic variables and
frequencies of specific responses for each survey ques-
tion were calculated. Denominators varied for several
questions as members did not always respond to all the
survey questions. Comparisons of responders and non-
responders, as well as comparisons in responses to the
two case scenarios were made using the chi-square test.
Figure 1 Case scenario pictures. A) Monkeypox case scenario: 23 year old male medical student with several pustular skin lesions (upper
and lower extremities including volar surfaces), lymphadenopathy, fever, chills, backache, malaise; he recently returned from Democratic Republic
of Congo where he examined patients with undiagnosed febrile rash illness. Photo by Dr. Janet A. Fairley, 2003. B) Orf case scenario: 42 year
old male with two large nonpruritic, painless vesicular lesions on thumb and forefinger; he denies other symptoms, works on farm and recently
purchased juvenile goats at auction (some of which had ulcers on their oral mucosa). Photo by Dr. Susan Meidl, 2006
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significant.
Of the 1,080 EIN members to whom surveys were dis-
tributed, 212 (20%) returned completed surveys. Of
these 212 surveys, 29 (13.7%) of them were returned
without a name and were not able to be linked to corre-
sponding demographic data. Respondents included phy-
sicians from all nine U.S. Bureau of Census divisions,
along with two respondents from Canada (Table 1).
Those with less than 10 years of experience were signifi-
cantly less likely to respond to the survey compared to
those with over 10 years experience (p = 0.02). Those
who teach were significantly more likely to respond to
the survey then those who don’t (p = 0.004). The lowest
response rates came from those in an urban setting,
those who do not teach, and those with less than 10
years of experience. EIN members from the New Eng-
land and Mid Atlantic region were the least likely to
respond to the survey, while those from the East North
Central, West South Central, and the Mountain region
were the most likely to respond.
Of the 212 respondents, significantly more, 22%,
would rely on clinical diagnosis alone for etiologic deter-
mination in the context of the orf case scenario in con-
trast to the monkeypox case scenario, 3% (p < 0.0001).
However, the majority of respondents indicated that
they would likely request laboratory testing for determi-
nation of poxvirus etiology for both case scenarios. Sig-
nificantly more respondents indicated that they would
likely request polymerase chain reaction (PCR) based
diagnostic technologies in the context of the monkeypox
case scenario as compared to the orf case scenario (87%,
vs.67.9%) (p < 0.001) (Table 2). Significantly more
respondents, 66.0%, indicated that they would choose a
state or federal lab in the monkeypox case for PCR test-
ing, versus 34.0% for the orf case (p < 0.001).
Significantly more respondents would order a serologi-
cal test for the monkeypox case scenario (72.6%) than
for the orf case (38.7%) (p < 0.0001). The majority indi-
cated that they would likely utilize a state or federal lab
for serologic testing in the context of the suspected
monkeypox case (50%) and the suspected orf case
(21.7%). A significantly higher number of respondents
would also order a culture or histopathology for the
monkeypox case (73.6%) in contrast to the orf case
(43.9%) (p < 0.0001). An in-house or local academic lab
w a sm o s tl i k e l yt ob ep i c k e df o rb o t hc a s es c e n a r i o s
(46.7% and 31.6% respectively).
When asked what type of precautionary measures they
would likely institute during examination of the patient’s
Table 1 Geographic and practice characteristics of
poxvirus survey respondents vs. entire EIN participant
base
Variable Respondents
(n = 212), no.
(%)
Total EIN
(n = 1076
†), no.
(%)
Response
rate
Type of practice
Adult 141 (77.5%) 786 (73.1%) 17.94%
Pediatric 34 (18.7%) 213 (19.8%) 15.96%
Adult & Pediatric 7 (3.9%) 75 (6.97%) 9.33%
Other 0 2 (0.18%)
Practice Location
Rural 11 (7.5%) 48 (6.8%) 22.92%
Suburban 40 (27.4%) 150 (21.3%) 26.67%
Urban 93 (63.7%) 496 (70.6%) 18.75%
combination 2 (1.4%) 9 (1.3%) 22.22%
Teach
Yes 131 (72.8%) 637 (61.6%) 20.57%
No 49 (27.2%) 397 (38.4%) 12.34%*
Practice Type
Academic 105 (52.2%) 404 (55.9%) 25.99%
Private 84 (41.8%) 264 (36.7%) 31.82%
Other 12 (6.0%) 54 (7.5%) 22.22%
Region
New England 13 (6.3%) 92 (8.6%) 13.83%
Mid Atlantic 28 (13.5%) 196 (18.2%) 14.29%
East North Central 36 (17.3%) 144 (13.4%) 25.00%
West North
Central
16 (7.7%) 75 (7.0%) 21.33%
South Atlantic 34 (16.4%) 214 (19.9%) 15.89%
East South Central 12 (5.8%) 49 (4.5%) 24.49%
West South
Central
18 (8.7%) 72 (6.7%) 25.00%
Mountain 14 (6.7%) 54 (5.0%) 25.93%
Pacific 35 (16.8%) 160 (14.9%) 21.88%
Canada 2 (1%) 13 (1.2%) 15.38%
Puerto Rico 0 (0%) 6 (0.6%)
No. yrs practice
<10 yrs 9 (8.0%) 74 (16.9%) 12.16%*
10-20 yrs 51 (45.5%) 162 (37.0%) 31.48%
21-30 yrs 38 (33.9%) 147 (33.6%) 25.85%
31+ yrs 14 (12.5%) 55 (12.6%) 25.45%
Note: # of respondents does not equal 21 for some variables due to missing
information
†Demographic data was available for 1076 of the 1080 EIN participants
* Variable group has significantly lower response rate compared to the rest of
the responses for that variable combined
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higher proportion of respondents indicated that they
would choose routine only precautions for the orf case
scenario (23.7%), as opposed to the monkeypox case
scenario (8.0%) (p < 0.0001) (Figure 2). A significantly
higher number of respondents indicated they would
institute droplet or airborne precautions for the mon-
keypox case (22.6% & 48.1% respectively), as opposed to
the orf case scenario (6.6% & 7.1%) (p < 0.0001).
When respondents were asked whom they might report
initial suspicion of poxvirus-associated illness, a signifi-
cantly higher proportion of respondents indicated that
they would report the suspected monkeypox case (88.2%)
as opposed to the orf case (66.8%) (p < 0.0001), with most
respondents choose the state or local health department as
the first point of contact for either scenario.
Respondents were also asked about the relative fre-
quency with which they have ever encountered different
Table 2 Diagnostic ordering preferences for the two case scenarios in the EIN poxvirus survey
Monkeypox Scenario Orf Scenario
Diagnostic Test Lab utilized # %* # %*
PCR In-house/local academic institution 61 28.8% 70 33.0%
State/Federal 140 66.0% 72 34.0%
Commercial reference lab 25 11.8% 26 12.3%
In-house/local academic institution 37 17.5% 17 8.0%
Serology State/Federal 106 50.0% 46 21.7%
Commercial reference lab 36 32.1% 28 13.2%
In-house/local academic institution 99 46.7% 67 31.6%
Culture/Histopathology State/Federal 68 32.1% 23 10.8%
Commercial reference lab 8 3.8% 6 2.8%
Note: Monkeypox specific PCR, culture and histopathology are currently available at CDC. Most state reference laboratories are able to perform orthopoxvirus
generic PCR. Serological testing at CDC is orthopoxvirus generic. Orf specific PCR is currently available at CDC while orf serology is available at an outside lab
(Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory, California Department of Public Health, Richmond, CA).
* Percent of total responders. Numbers do not add up to 100% as respondents were able to pick multiple choices.
Figure 2 Likely precautionary measures indicated for each hypothetical case scenario. The numbers in each portion of the diagram
represent the number of respondents choosing that combination of precautions. The appropriate choices have been bolded. CDC recommends
a combination of standard, contact, and droplet precautions for possible monkeypox virus (or other systemic orthopoxvirus) infections. In
addition, because of the theoretical risk of airborne transmission, Airborne Precautions should be applied whenever possible. CDC recommends
standard precautions for possible orf virus infections.
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ity (96.7%) had seen at least one case of molluscum conta-
giosum with 74.5% having seen five or more cases. 6%
reported having seen at least 1 case of monkeypox, with
six of these physicians practicing in the Midwest region
(Figure 3). 4.7% reported having seen a case of vaccinia in
a lab worker while 8.9% had seen a vaccinia infection in a
social contact of a vaccinee. Respondents from each of the
EIN regions reported having seen orf, with the largest
number of those being in the Pacific, East North Central
and South Atlantic region. Four respondents reported see-
ing a case of sealpox (one respondent in Providence, Hali-
fax, and Sacramento and one in an unknown location). No
one reported seeing a case of tanapox or a case of oral
rabies vaccine (ORV) related human infection.
This survey provided an opportunity for public health
practitioners to gain insight into physician approaches
to evaluation, diagnosis and reporting of suspected pox-
virus-associated infections. As a result we were able to
identify potential knowledge gaps and deficits in the
availability of useful resources to facilitate accurate case
identification and management.
One of the weaknesses of this study was a low survey
response rate. Several factors could account for this.
Anecdotal suggestions are that many potential respon-
ders felt they were being “tested” rather than queried,
and different professional groups had different response
rates. Those who did not teach and those with less then
10 years of experience had a significantly lower response
rate. Infectious disease physicians with less experience
are probably less likely to have encountered some of
these uncommon diseases and thereby are less likely to
see the relevance of this query. Response rates also var-
ied between regions, which could be due to differences
in poxviruses seen in these regions.
While this sample may not be representative of the
country’s infectious disease physicians, it likely encom-
passes the best informed and the least apt to be dis-
suaded by lack of immediate knowledge. Respondents
were able to suggest appropriate infection control mea-
sures, such as a combination of standard, contact and
droplet precautions for monkeypox and standard precau-
tions for orf, and pursued reasonable reporting mechan-
isms. A large proportion of respondents did, however,
indicate that they would institute higher then necessary
transmission precautions for the orf case scenario. We
found that respondents were not necessarily aware of
diagnostic tests available or where to find them. How-
ever, the majority of respondents did indicate they would
order diagnostic testing for both case scenarios.
The public health community can play a greater role
in reinforcing messages to health practitioners to
Figure 3 Suspected poxvirus infections (omitting molluscum contagiosum) reported by region. Each block in the bar charts represents
one respondent. To permit more accurate comparisons of inter-regional variations, graduated green circles show the total number of
respondents separated into three classes.
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dealing with suspected cases of poxvirus infection. They
can also play an active role in disseminating information
about new diagnostic tests (such as PCR and serologic
tests). In response to findings from the survey, EIN
members were provided a survey report summarizing
CDC recommendations for the various scenarios [Addi-
tional file 2]. We also produced a fact sheet containing
information pertinent to which diagnostic tests are cur-
rently available at CDC and elsewhere for etiologic
determination of poxvirus-associated infection [Addi-
tional file 3]. The findings from this survey will also
help guide us in the redesign of CDC’s poxvirus website.
We will make infection control practices, diagnostic
capabilities, and reporting mechanisms more readily
available on the website for physicians.
Poxviruses occur across the U.S. and around the
world. Infectious disease physicians may not be the first
clinicians to see patients with suspected poxvirus infec-
tions, but many will be asked to provide expert advice
and consultation. Infectious disease physicians should be
provided with the necessary tools to make well-informed
decisions regarding suspected cases of poxvirus infec-
tions. This survey identified key areas in which public
health practitioners can better serve physicians by focus-
ing on education. These key areas include infection con-
trol practices and knowledge of various diagnostic tests
available for poxviruses. Similar knowledge gaps exist
for other relatively rare diseases that could become
more common in an outbreak setting. This type of sur-
vey could also be helpful in bringing attention to those
gaps and providing innovative ways to keep physicians
better informed.
Additional file 1: Poxvirus EIN survey. A copy of the poxvirus survey
sent to EIN members
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1756-0500-3-46-
S1.DOC]
Additional file 2: Final survey report. EIN members were provided
with this survey report summarizing CDC recommendations for the
various scenarios
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1756-0500-3-46-
S2.DOC]
Additional file 3: Poxvirus diagnostic fact sheet. Fact sheet containing
information pertinent to which diagnostic tests are currently available at
CDC and elsewhere for etiologic determination of poxvirus-associated
infection
Click here for file
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/supplementary/1756-0500-3-46-
S3.DOC]
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